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A STUDY OF COMPLIANCE POST-OFT INFRINGEMENT ACTION !  
A. INTRODUCTION 
The increasing level of fines being imposed on companies for involvement in anti-
competitive activity in recent years,1 has ensured that compliance with competition law 
generally, and the interaction between OFT competition law enforcement and the 
development of corporate compliance strategies more specifically, are becoming 
increasingly significant. In this context, the OFT’s role in advocating and promoting 
compliance with UK competition law is vitally important but was the subject of criticism 
by the National Audit Office in 2005:-   
  
“The OFT surveys of business awareness of the competition regime have shown 
increasing awareness of competition legislation. Over half of the companies 
                                                 
! Professor Barry J Rodger, The Law School, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, 
barry.j.rodger@strath.ac.uk. Many thanks to Dr Andreas Stephan, Norwich Law School and ESRC 
Centre for Competition Policy, UEA, and Dr Christine Parker, University of Melbourne, Australia for 
helpful comments on an earlier draft. Responsibility for the article and for any errors or omissions remain 
mine alone 
1 See the OFT Register of decisions on its website at 
http://www.oft.gov.uk/advice_and_resources/resource_base/ca98/decisions/ accessed on 4 April 2008.  On 
fines more generally, see C Veljanovski “Penalties for Price Fixers: An Analysis of Fines Imposed on 39 
Cartels under EC Antitrust” [2006] European Competition Law Review 510 and “Cartel Fines in Europe” 
[2007] World Competition 65. 
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surveyed, however, are still not aware of the laws and there is a clear relationship 
between awareness and size of company…The surveys also showed that 
awareness of the competition regime did not necessarily mean that companies 
understood their content. Nearly 40 per cent of respondents believed their 
knowledge of the legislation to be ‘nothing’. This highlights a lack of 
understanding about competition matters, given that the interviews were 
conducted with the ‘person in the organization responsible for legal matters 
relating to trading practices.”2  
 
The background to the debate on compliance strategies is the dramatic reform of UK 
competition law brought about primarily by the Competition Act 1998, which introduced, 
as of 1 March 2000, two new prohibitions, (the Chapter I and Chapter II prohibitions). It 
also afforded significant investigative and fining powers to the UK competition 
authorities (primarily the OFT) for the first time.3 The radical change to a prohibition 
system with fines of up to 10% of world-wide turnover sought to enhance the deterrent 
effect of UK competition law, and since 1 March 2000 there has been a considerable 
body of practice developed by the OFT (and other regulators) and numerous fines 
                                                 
2 National Audit Office, “The Office of Fair Trading – Enforcing Competition in Markets”, report by the 
comptroller and auditor general, HC 593 Session 2005-2006, November 17, 2005. para.4.1.3 [available 
online at: www.nao.org.uk/pn/05-06/0506593.htm accessed on 5 April 2008]. See also G Murphy, “Auditor 
General Recommends the OFT Step it Up” [2006] European Competition Law Review 391. 
3 See B Rodger and A MacCulloch, (eds) The UK Competition Act: A New Era for UK Competition Law 
(Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2000); B Rodger, “The Impact of the Competition Act 1998: A New Competition 
Culture Emerges” (2002) 7 Scottish Law and Practice Quarterly 97. 
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levied.4 Perhaps unsurprisingly, there was very little research prior to the 1998 Act in 
relation to business attitudes towards UK competition law. In 1992 Aaranson suggested 
that “business does not take competition policy adequately into account” and his 
experience was that companies did not plan rationally around the constraints it imposed.5 
Frazer’s subsequent empirical work, prior to the adoption of the 1998 Act, sought 
companies’ views on certain propositions as to why they might comply, concluding that 
the purported deterrent effect of the potential imposition of fines was not clear-cut.6 
Despite the new deterrence-based regime and the OFT’s education initiative to enhance 
awareness and promote compliance, particularly in the period between the Act being 
passed and the prohibitions coming into force, very little empirical work has been 
undertaken on the relationship between enforcement and compliance in a UK context.7 In 
previous work, I undertook research into changes in compliance following the 
introduction of the Competition Act 1998,8 and thereafter a more detailed study of three 
sample companies in the UK to assess the extent to which a compliance culture had 
                                                 
4 See http://www.oft.gov.uk/advice_and_resources/resource_base/ca98/decisions/ accessed at 4 April 2008.   
5 A Aaranson, ‘Do Companies Take any notice of Competition Policy’ (1992) 2 Consumer Policy Review 
140-145. 
6 T Frazer, “Big Boys’ Games, Big Boys’ rules: Compliance, Competition Law and the Criminology of the 
Corporation’ paper presented at Socio-Legal Studies association Annual Conference March 1995 and T 
Frazer, “Monopoly, Prohibition and Deterrence” (1995) 58 Modern Law Review 846. 
7  See, for instance, OFT, Competition Act Awareness Report, 2000, by Sample Surveys Ltd. 
8 Rodger, B “Compliance with Competition Law; A View from Industry” [2000] Commercial Liability Law 
Review 249. 
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developed within those companies.9 More recently, the OFT commissioned a study into 
the deterrent effect of UK competition law enforcement, which noted inter alia that 
average consumer savings from Competition Act 1998 infringement decisions between 
2004 and 2007 were £64mill per year.10  
                                                
Despite the limited work in a UK, and European, context, there has been fairly extensive 
research into competition law compliance in Australia.11 For over twenty years now the 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (‘ACCC’) has sought to become 
more strategic, particularly by focusing on ‘nurturing compliance’. Dr Christine Parker 
 
9 B Rodger ‘Competition Law Compliance Programmes: A Study of Motivations and Practice’ (2005) 
World Competition 349.   
10 The deterrent effect of Competition enforcement by the OFT, A report prepared for the OFT by Deloitte, 
November 2007, OFT 962 at para. 2.5. 
11 Dr Christine Parker has been at the forefront of a number of research initiatives in this area. For instance, 
in 1999 she focused on the question how companies and regulators will be able to determine whether a 
compliance programme is effective;- C Parker, “Evaluating Regulatory Compliance: Standards and Best 
Practice” (1999) 7 The Trade Practices Journal 62. See also “Compliance professionalism and regulatory 
community: The Australian trade practices regime” (1999) 26 Journal of Law & Society 215; C Parker 
and Connolly, “Is there a duty to implement a corporate compliance system in Australian law?” (2002) 
30(4) Australian Business Law Review 275; C Parker, “Regulator-required corporate compliance program 
audits” (2003) 25 Law and Policy 221; see also C Parker The Open Corporation, (Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2003). 
In this context, Parker’s most recent work is also notable. As part of the Centre for Competition and 
Consumer Policy, a detailed project has been undertaken on compliance and enforcement with 
competition law in Australia: - see Parker and Stepanenko, Compliance and Enforcement Project: 
Preliminary Research Report, 2003, Centre for Competition and Consumer Policy, Australian National 
University, Canberra, http://www.cccp.anu.edu.au/projects/project1.html accessed at 5 April 2008. 
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has been particularly prominent in developing a body of academic work focusing on 
ACCC encouragement of compliance-oriented enforcement strategies under the Trade 
Practices Act and empirically testing the extent to which Australian business have 
implemented effective compliance programmes.12 This Enforcement and Compliance 
Survey involved lengthy questionnaires being forwarded to the largest 2321 Australian 
businesses trading in 2004 in relation to their compliance programmes, practices and 
attitudes to enforcement by the ACCC under the TPA.13 One of the principal findings of 
the Australian compliance study was that commitment to compliance was demonstrably 
greater where a business had already been the subject of TPA enforcement action by the 
ACCC.  
Following those findings from the Australian compliance study, it was decided to focus 
on companies which had already been subject to infringement action under the 
Competition Act 1998. The aim of the research was to ascertain commitment to 
compliance by companies in the UK post-infringement involving their awareness of 
                                                 
12 ACCC Enforcement and Compliance Survey: Report of Preliminary Findings, December 2005, Dr V L 
Nielsen. and Dr C Parker. 
13 C Parker, C and V L Nielsen, “Do Businesses Take Compliance Systems Seriously?: An Empirical Study 
of the Implementation of Trade Practices Compliance Systems in Australia” (2006) 30 Melbourne 
University Law Review 441; C Parker, and V L Nielsen, “What do Australian Businesses Really Think of 
the ACCC, and Does it Matter?” (2007) 34 Federal Law Review 1; C Parker and V L Nielsen, “How Much 
Does it Hurt? How Australian Businesses Think about the Costs and Gains of Compliance with the Trade 
Practices Act” Melbourne Law School Legal Studies Research paper no 310, ssrn.com/abstract=1085054, 
accessed on 5 April 2008; C Parker, and V L Nielsen, “To What Extent do Third Parties Influence Business 
Compliance’ forthcoming. Hereinafter, this work shall be referred to collectively as the ‘Australian 
compliance study’. 
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competition law, their attitude to competition law and authorities, the impact of 
enforcement on their organization, the extent to which elements of a formal compliance 
programme had been adopted, and how they perceived the range of costs and gains of 
compliance and non-compliance. The research sought to ascertain levels of compliance 
commitment in this defined business group where one would have expected greater 
awareness and a more coherent approach to compliance. It would also allow us to reflect 
on the OFT’s competition law enforcement strategies and to make some tentative 
comparisons with the outcomes of the Australian compliance study on similar themes and 
issues associated with compliance.14 Accordingly, the questionnaire utilized was 
modeled, in terms of structure and the content of particular questions, on the Australian 
compliance survey questionnaire in order to allow for comparability. The article will first 
outline the Australian compliance study and then proceed to discuss the research 
methodology, response rate and the principal findings of the current study on the various 
aspects of the questionnaire outlined above, before drawing conclusions in relation to the 
compliance practice of the respondents and the implications for an appropriate education 
strategy by the OFT to further encourage and facilitate compliance behaviour. 
 
B. THE AUSTRALIAN COMPLIANCE STUDY 
                                                 
14 This paper will not tackle the more problematic issue of the relationship between corporate liability and 
internal compliance mechanisms. See for instance, W S Laufer, “Corporate Liability, Risk Shifting, and the 
Paradox of Compliance” (1999) 52 Vanderbilt Law Review 1343; K D Krawiec, “Organizational 
Misconduct: Beyond the Principal-Agent Model” 32 Florida State University Law Review 571; J Hill, 
“Corporate Criminal liability in Australia: An Evolving Corporate Governance Technique” [2003] Journal 
of Business Law 1. 
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Following the research undertaken in the Australian compliance survey, Parker and 
Nielsen have considered various aspects of the multi-faceted research outcomes.15 In 
doing so, they emphasised the role of the ACCC in using its  
 
“enforcement, as well as its educative and liaison activities, to encourage the 
adoption of compliance systems. In doing so, the ACCC hopes to garner both 
deeper and wider business commitment to, and achievement of, competition and 
consumer protection goals that it can accomplish through litigation alone.”16  
 
The ACCC has sought to nurture compliance professionalism and adopt strategies to 
encourage greater and wider adoption and implementation of compliance systems 
involving a wide range of key elements, inter alia, the adoption of a compliance policy, 
the appointment of a compliance officer or dedicated compliance unit, a complaints 
handling system, frequent training of staff and regular reviews of the system’s 
effectiveness.17 Parker and Nielsen assessed the extent to which businesses adopted a 
number of key compliance elements, which were divided into four groups: complaints 
handling; communication and training; management and accountability and 
whistleblowing; and performance measurement and discipline. Generally, the results 
suggested that ‘implementation of trade practices compliance systems is partial, symbolic 
                                                 
15 See supra n 13. 
16 C Parker, and V L Nielsen, “Do Businesses Take Compliance Systems Seriously?: An Empirical Study 
of the Implementation of Trade Practices Compliance Systems in Australia” (2006) 30 Melbourne 
University Law Review 441, 445. 
17 Ibid 450-455. 
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and half-hearted’18 but that ACCC enforcement action improved compliance system 
implementation across each of the groups.19 On this basis, one would anticipate that the 
results in terms of compliance system implementation, considering similar elements 
across the four main group headings, would be more favourable in the context of research 
targeted at business which had already been the subject of competition enforcement 
action in the UK. 
As noted earlier, various aspects of the research are modelled on the Australian study, 
and one important issue is business perceptions of the competition authority’s role and its 
impact on how those businesses engage with and interact with the law.20 This is crucial in 
developing a compliance-oriented approach, which is not simply predicated on assessing 
enforcement strategies and the outcome of authority enforcement actions but seeks to 
understand how and why businesses comply or do not comply with the law, and how this 
may be facilitated.21 Parker and Nielsen argue that the three main theories which seek to 
explain compliance behaviour are: - 1) deterrence theory, based on rational and 
calculated decisions by actors;22 2) compliance based on a ‘normative commitment’ to 
                                                 
18 Ibid, 444. See also K Krawiec, “Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated Governance” (2003) 
81 Washington University Law Quarterly 487 and the concern with ‘cosmetic compliance’. 
19 Parker and Nielsen, supra n 16, 476. 
20 C Parker, C and V L Nielsen, “What do Australian Businesses Really Think of the ACCC, and Does it 
Matter?” (2007) 34 Federal Law Review 1. 
21 Ibid, 4. 
22 See S Simpson, Corporate Crime, Law and Social Control (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2002) 22-44 for a fuller discussion of this issue including, at 41, the critique of the limits of rationality in 
this context, indicating that compliance is more likely to be affected by a party’s ‘perceptual deterrence’, a 
more appropriate subjective test.  
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the legitimacy of the legal rules; and 3) the important of the social influence exerted by 
peer and third party groups to comply or not with particular legal rules.23 Accordingly, 
potentially there are pluralistic motivations for compliance with legal rules,24 which 
would support the responsive regulation model developed primarily by Braithewaite.25 
The current research considers the extent to which a range of motivating factors are 
relevant to respondents’ compliance decisions and relates these broadly to those three 
main theories. More specifically, we will look closely at business perceptions as to the 
costs and gains of compliance and non-compliance with the Competition Act.26 In this 
context, classical deterrence theory is based on rational calculations about potential gains 
and losses associated with a breach of the law.27 However, Parker and Nielsen, in a 
related paper on costs and gains in relation to the Australian compliance study,28 stressed 
the limitations on apparently rational, objective calculation and noted a more recent 
                                                 
23 See S Winter, and P May, “Motivation for Compliance with Environmental Regulations” (2001) 20 
Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 675, 678. 
24 See Winter and May ibid, regarding their threefold typology of compliance motivating factors: - 
‘calculative’, ‘normative’ and ‘social’. 
25 See J Braithwaite, Restorative Justice and Responsive Regulation (New York/Oxford, OUP, 2002); I 
Ayres, and J Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate, (New 
York/Oxford, OUP, 1992) 
26 C Parker, and V L Nielsen, “How Much Does it Hurt? How Australian Businesses Think about the Costs 
and Gains of Compliance with the Trade Practices Act” Melbourne Law School Legal Studies Research 
paper no 310, ssrn.com/abstract=1085054 accessed on 5 April 2008. 
27 See, for example, J Scholz, “Enforcement Policy and Corporate Misconduct: The Changing Perspectives 
of Deterrence Theory” (1997) 60 Law and Contemporary Problems 253. 
28 Parker and Nielsen, supra,  n 26. 
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emphasis in the field on ‘perceptual deterrence’.29 Accordingly, when the focus shifts 
from the strategy of regulatory enforcement to understanding compliance and business 
perceptions of risk, a broader awareness of the factors which may actually drive 
compliance decisions is required than simply considering formal sanctions.30 Moreover, 
it can be argued that the concept of deterrence extends to the consideration to the various 
informal social and economic sanctions that can inform, generate and influence business 
compliance.31 This was a particularly important strand in the Australian compliance 
study and Nielsen and Parker note, in a further paper, that  
                                                
 
“one of the main policy messages of the current literature on regulatory 
compliance is that there is likely to be a higher rate of business compliance with 
the law when a plurality of actors (public and private) utilise their plural resources 
and relationships with regulatees to activate the plurality of motivations for 
compliance than when regulatory agencies rely on official powers alone.”32  
 
Therefore, third parties, notably social and economic stakeholders, may play an important 
role in developing a compliance culture by playing on a combination of businesses’ 
 
29 Ibid, 16 
30 Ibid, 19. 
31 Ibid, 13. See also for example, J Braithwaite, Crime Shame and Reintegration (Cambridge/New York, 
Cambridge University Press, 1988) 71-75. 
32 C Parker, and V L Nielsen, “To What Extent do Third Parties Influence Business Compliance’ 
forthcoming at 3. 
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calculative, social and normative motivations to comply,33 and we sought to ascertain any 
such influence in the current study. 
 
C. THE COMPLIANCE RESEARCH STUDY 
1. Methodology 
The research was commenced in Summer 2006 and a database of all infringement 
decisions under the Competition Act 1998 between 1 March 2000 and the end of 2005 
was compiled,34 including details of all parties which were the subject of infringement 
decisions, given the focus of the research on parties subject to enforcement action. This 
included the party deemed to be in infringement of the Chapter II prohibition by the CAT 
in Burgess v OFT,35 which overruled the earlier OFT decision that there had been no 
infringement. This was a census-based research in which questionnaires were forwarded 
to all infringing parties within the relevant period, addressed to either the company 
secretary or the managing director in the first instance.36 The questionnaires were 
modelled on parts of the Australian compliance survey questionnaire, and contained a 
                                                 
33  S Winter, and P May, “Motivation for compliance with environmental regulations” (2001) 20 Journal of 
Policy Analysis and Management 675 regarding the tripartite categorisation of calculative, social and 
normative motivations. See also N Gunningham, R A Kagan, and D Thornton, Shades of Green: Business, 
Regulation and Environment (Stanford University Press, 2003) 35-38, where they categorise different 
business ‘stakeholders’ into three groups: ‘economic stakeholders’ ‘legal or regulatory stakeholders’ and 
‘social stakeholders’.  
34 This extended to 17 Chapter 1 infringement decisions and 5 Chapter 2 infringement decisions. 
35 [2005] CAT 25, 6 July 2005. 
36 It should be noted that some parties appeared in relation to more than one infringement, but they were 
only forwarded one questionnaire. 
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range of questions within the following main sections, with scope also for further 
comments: - your organisation, the Competition Act 1998 and the OFT; your 
organisation’s knowledge of the 1998 Act; the impact of the Act on your Organisation; 
and the costs and benefits of complying with the Act.37 This is the order in which the 
results will be discussed in the article. 
 
2. Response Rate 
Questionnaires were mailed to 81 organisations which had breached either Competition 
Act prohibition during the relevant period. In total, 20 completed questionnaires were 
returned over a period of 10 months between 24 August 2006 and 22 June 2007. During 
this period there was considerable follow-up correspondence, calls and e-mails to all 
relevant organizations. Of the other 61 organisations, 48 simply refused to answer the 
questionnaire. The remaining 13 organizations could not be contacted or had gone out of 
business and were accordingly excluded when calculating the response rate which is 
33%.38 It should also be noted that questionnaires were entitled Chapter 1 or Chapter II 
prohibition when forwarded as appropriate to the relevant organizations and all 20 
responses were by parties which had infringed the Chapter I prohibition. The response 
rate of 33% is reasonable, if slightly lower than similar management focused 
                                                 
37It should of course be noted that the respondents compliance activity may not simply be based on UK 
competition law and OFT enforcement activity, but may also be influenced by the impact of EC 
competition law and DG Comp enforcement action, although it would be difficult to distil the effects of 
these two complementary systems, and the current research does not seek to do so. 
38 Questionnaires could not be delivered in 9 cases and 4 organisations had been taken over or had gone 
into liquidation/administration. 
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questionnaire-based studies,39 and notably the Australian study response rate was 43%,40 
although the general difficulties in persuading senior management to respond to 
questionnaires in recent years has been regularly commented upon.41 The response rate is 
considerably higher than the 9.5% response rate for the other major competition law 
compliance study in the UK in 2000.42 Furthermore, given the anticipated difficulties in 
securing responses from organizations to a survey about their own illegal conduct 
                                                 
39 See for instance, M A McKendall, and J A Wagner, “Motive, Opportunity, Choice, and Corporate 
Illegality” (1997) 8 Organization Science 624 where a response rate of 34% was obtained in relation to 
surveys sent to two different management targets within the largest 1000 US  corporations; J Batten, S 
Hettihewa and R Mellor, “The Ethical Management Practices of Australian Firms” (1997) 16 Journal of 
Business Ethics 16: 1261, involving a 27.6% response rate in a study into Australian business and ethical 
management practices; and  G R Weaver, T K Trevino, and P L Cochran, “Corporate Ethics Practices in the 
Mid-1990's: An Empirical Study of the Fortune 1000” (1999) 18 Journal of Business Ethics 283 which 
resulted in a response rate of 26%. 
40 There were considerable time and resources devoted to this project, with an average of 29 phone calls per 
completed questionnaire and many additional e-mails and postal contacts. 
41 N Gunningham,  R A Kagan and D Thornton, “Social License and Environmental Protection: Why 
Businesses Go Beyond Compliance” (2004) 29 Law & Social Inquiry 307; J Goyder and  J McK Leiper, 
“The Decline in Survey Response: A Social Values Interpretation” and J J Hox and E D de Leeuw, “A 
Comparison of Non-Response in Mail, Telephone and Face-to-Face Surveys” in D De Vaus (ed.), Social 
Surveys (London, Sage Publications, 2002) 191-210 and 157-171 respectively; T V Greer,  N 
Chuchinprakarn, and S Seshadri, “Likelihood of Participating in Mail Survey Research: Business 
Respondents' Perspectives” (2000) 29 Industrial Marketing Management 97. M Useem, “Reaching 
Corporate Executives”, in R Hertz and J B Imber (eds.), Studying Corporate Elites Using Qualitative 
Methods (Thousand Oaks, Sage Publications, 1995) 18-39. 
42 See Rodger supra, n 9. 
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focusing on how and why organizations had not complied with the law and how this 
position may or may not have changed subsequently, 33% is a reasonably satisfactory 
response rate. Nonetheless, we are dealing with results from a very small number of 
completed questionnaires, 20 in total, and the study is not intended to be scientific or give 
any accurate representation of compliance behaviour by UK industry generally, but 
merely provides indications of the experience and attitudes of a limited sub-group of UK 
businesses. As indicated, the research only focused on companies subject to UK 
infringement action in the relevant period, on the basis of the hypotheses that they would 
have the greatest compliance commitment.43 The questionnaires requested information 
about the individuals completing the questionnaire and this generally demonstrated their 
experienced background within the relevant organization, with the respondents including 
9 managing directors, 1 Chairman, 6 directors, 1 secretary, 1 general counsel, a manager 
and a director. All had worked for more than 1.5 years within the relevant organisation, 
only 2 had worked for less than 8 years and the mean was 19.1 years experience within 
the organization. The mean period for respondents in their present formal position within 
the organization was 10 years (9.99), with only two being in that position for under two 
years. Accordingly, the individual respondents generally had a clear appreciation of the 
background to their organisation’s efforts at competition law compliance and the impact 
of the infringement decision on compliance management in practice, although it should 
                                                 
43 Accordingly, we did not utilise a control sample of matched businesses which had not been subject to 
enforcement action. Furthermore, it would have been impossible, in an anonymous survey, to ensure 
appropriate identification and matching as between responses from the two different sets of organisations. 
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be stressed that one should be cautious about over-reliance on self-report data in relation 
to compliance activity. 
 
3. The Research Outcomes 
 
(a) Your Organisation, the Act and the OFT I- Views on Competition 
 
Table 1 
Views on 
Impact of:- 
Very 
damaging 
Damaging Neither Beneficial Very 
Beneficial 
Scale 
(1-5) 
Agreements 
to fix prices 
25 35 35 5 0 2.4 
Agreements 
to share 
markets 
20 25 30 25 0 2.6 
Abuse of 
dominance 
45 40 15 0 0 1.7 
 
Table 1 details the respondents’ answers concerning the extent to which various practices 
were damaging or beneficial to UK economic well-being to assess their attitude to 
particular types of anti-competitive behaviour. As throughout, the responses are noted as 
percentages and the mean answer to the responses is noted on the basis of the scale 1-5, 
from very damaging (1) to very beneficial (5). Under the Australian compliance study, 
87% and 78% agreed that price-fixing and market sharing respectively were damaging or 
very damaging, compared to the figures of 60% and 45% obtained in this study. 
Interestingly, all questionnaires were returned by parties which had breached the Chapter 
I prohibition, (which deals with anti-competitive agreements such as price-fixing and 
market sharing), and 85% of respondents considered abuse of dominance (dealt with by 
the Chapter II prohibition) to be damaging or very damaging, despite the general 
16 
 
consensus that cartel activity (particularly price-fixing) is the most heinous anti-
competitive behaviour.44  
 
Table 2 
Views on: Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neither Agree Strongly 
agree 
Don’t 
Know 
Scale 
(1-5) 
Competition  
Act has Clear 
Goals 
5 30 5 45 10 5 3.26 
(3.78) 
Most Managers 
ashamed if 
caught 
Breaching Act 
5 20 15 40 20 0 3.5 
(4.07) 
Most Managers 
ashamed if 
committed 
Breaching Act 
5 15 15 50 15 0 3.55 
(4.04) 
 
Table 2 details the respondents’ answers to three questions concerning attitudes to the 
Competition Act and its breach by the company. The mean answer to the responses is 
noted on the basis of the scale 1-5, from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5),45 and 
as throughout, where available, the equivalent result from the Australian compliance 
study will be included in brackets for comparative purposes.46 55% agreed or agreed 
strongly that the Act has clear goals, whereas the figure for the Australian compliance 
                                                 
44 Referred to as “The supreme evil of antitrust”  by Justice Scalia, Justice of the US Supreme Court in 
Verizon Communications Inc v. Law Offices of Curtis v Trinko LLP 540 US (2004) 8.  
45The mean for the first issue in Table 2 was calculated on the basis of 19 responses as there was one 
‘Don’t Know’ response which could not be placed on the scale. 
46 As noted above, it should be stressed that the results for the Australian compliance study includes all 
respondents, not simply those from infringing businesses. Nonetheless, the figures are lower in the 
current study, restricted to businesses which have infringed UK competition law, in respect of virtually all 
issues which would demonstrate a positive attitude and commitment to compliance. 
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study in relation to the goals of the TPA was 77%.47 Similarly, although 60% and 65% 
agreed or agreed strongly that most managers would be ashamed if they were 
caught/committed a breach of the Act, the figures for Australia were considerably higher 
at 95% and 86% respectively.48   
 
(b) Your Organisation, the Act and the OFT II- OFT Enforcement Action 
Table 3 
Views on: Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neither Agree Strongly 
Agree 
Don’t 
Know 
Scale 
(1-5) 
Breach Act- 
Chances being 
Caught Slight 
10 60 10 15 5 0 2.45 
Breach Act- 
Enforcement by 
OFT Slight 
35 40 10 15 0 0 2.2 
(3.77) 
OFT wide range 
of effective 
sanctions 
5 15 5 40 45 0 3.85 
(3.65) 
Hard for OFT to 
uncover 
breaches 
0 30 20 35 5 10 3.17 
(3.65) 
Complexity of 
Tasks- OFT has 
few resources 
10 35 30 10 15 0 2.94 
(2.82) 
OFT Staff 
competent 
compared to 
company 
lawyers 
15 30 30 10 5 10 2.56 
(2.89) 
OFT Keeping a 
close eye on our 
Industry 
5 10 15 35 25 10 3.72 
(3.23) 
Breach Severe 
before OFT Acts 
30 50 15 0 0 5 1.84 
                                                 
47 See Nielsen and Parker, 2005 Report, supra  n 20, 92. 
48 C Parker and V L Nielsen, “Do Businesses Take Compliance Systems Seriously?: An Empirical Study 
of the Implementation of Trade Practices Compliance Systems in Australia” (2006) 30 Melbourne 
University Law Review 441 at 487. 
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Level of 
Sanctions for 
Breach 
generally v low 
40 40 15 5 0 0 1.85 
 
 
Table 3 details the respondents’ answers to a number of questions concerning what 
Parker and Nielsen have called ‘the barometer of regulatory threat’.49 The relatively high 
figure of 70% disagreement with the proposition that the chances of being caught are 
slight must reflect to some extent the focus of this study on post-infringement compliance 
which makes it difficult to draw any general conclusions or any direct comparisons with 
the Australian compliance study involving a much larger sample with non-infringing 
businesses. Nonetheless, the figures for the final three issues are also notable, with a 
majority of respondents, 60%, in agreement that the OFT is keeping a close eye on our 
industry and a preponderance of respondents, 80%, disagreeing that the breach must be 
severe before the OFT acts and that the level of sanctions for breach is generally very 
low, although this may reflect the post-infringement context of the respondents in this 
study. Parker and Nielsen have similarly noted in relation to the Australian compliance 
study, that it is not surprising that those ‘who have interacted with the ACCC ….have a 
higher view of the likelihood and severity of enforcement action.’50 
                                                 
49 See Nielsen and Parker, Report of Preliminary Findings, December 2005, Chapter 6.  It should be noted 
that the mean from the Australian compliance study has been omitted in certain answers where the 
questions were reversed. See Parker and Nielsen, supra n 20,13-14. In addition, some of the mean figures 
in the current study were calculated on the basis of the responses excluding those which selected ‘don’t 
know’. 
50 Parker and Nielsen, supra n 20, 30. 
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(c) Self-estimated levels of compliance 
 
We asked respondents to assess their organisation’s culture of compliance51 and actual 
compliance during the years 2000-2006 inclusive. We provided a scale of 1-100 for each 
year and asked respondents to mark appropriately, with 100 denoting that the culture or 
actual levels of compliance were very high. Graphs 1-4 provide details of the responses 
for 2000 and 2006 respectively in each category. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph 1 
                                                 
51 By culture of compliance we noted that this meant ‘attitudes and systems that support compliance with 
the Competition Act 1998’. 
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Graph 2 
  
 
21 
 
 
Graph 3 
 
 
 
Graph 4 
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These graphs demonstrate a number of points, first the respondents’ low levels of 
compliance self-estimation in 2000.52 They also show considerably higher levels of self-
estimated compliance in the most recent year 2006, and over the intervening years there 
is a slow but noticeable shift to the right-hand side of the graph. This is perhaps due to 
greater awareness of the significant fines imposed under UK competition law in recent 
years but probably mainly reflects the fact that there has been an infringement decision 
against the organisation at some stage during this period, following which it would be 
anticipated, in accordance with the Australian compliance study, that greater steps would 
be taken to ensure compliance. Nonetheless, self-estimated levels of compliance should 
be treated with caution, and, as demonstrated below, it is clearly not reflected in the 
extent to which organizations have actually implemented key elements of a compliance 
programme.  
 
 
(d) Knowledge of Act 
 
Table 4 
Views on: Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neither Agree Strongly 
agree 
Scale 
(1-5) 
Believe organisation 
and employees well-
informed re Act 
5 15 15 40 25 3.65 
(3.42) 
 
Table 5 
Views on: Very 
badly 
badly Neither Well Very 
well 
Scale 
(1-5) 
Believe organisation 10 15 45 25 5 3 
                                                 
52 Cf Rodger supra n 9, where 77.3% responded that they had a specific competition compliance 
programme or as part of w wider regulatory compliance programme. 59.6% responded that they had 
changed or planned to change their compliance programme to take account of the 1998 Act. 
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and employees 
understand 
philosophy/principles 
of Act 
(3.34) 
 
Tables 4 and 5 detail the respondents’ answers to two key questions regarding their 
knowledge and understanding of the Competition Act 1998. Impressively, 65% agreed, or 
agreed strongly, with the belief that their organisation and employees were well-informed 
about the Act. The mean of 3.65 is accordingly very high and one of the few instances 
throughout the research where the figure for compliance or awareness is higher than 
under the Australian compliance study (3.42), despite the expectation derived from the 
latter that compliance commitment would be anticipated to be greater generally post-
infringement or “brush with the authorities”.53 Nonetheless, unfortunately this response is 
not reflected in respect of the range of more specific and detailed questions regarding 
compliance programmes and practice, considered further infra.  
 
(e) Impact of Act on Your Organisation 
The following sections consider various aspects of the ways in which businesses may 
seek to ensure compliance with competition law, and form the key aspect of the research 
process.  In the first section we will assess the extent to which a compliance management 
system has been put in place in practice by asking statements about things that 
organizations do to ensure compliance with competition law, and assessing whether 
respondents agreed with the various statements, as set out in Table 5 and Graph 5. 
Thereafter we will consider the extent to which various key elements of a compliance 
                                                 
53 See Nielsen and Parker, 2005 Report, supra  n 20 supra, 69. In Rodger, supra n 9, 56% claimed to be 
fully aware of the 1998 Act, the figure for partially and fully aware combined was 82.3%, and this figure 
increased to 93.6% including those simply aware of the Act. 
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programme form part of that organisation’s internal management systems.54 These more 
specific questions, as set out in Tables 6-9, help us to understand the extent to which 
compliance has been embedded in the company’s management systems.55 Table 10 
provides a comparison with the results from the Australian compliance study in relation 
to the key elements of a compliance programme. To test the extent to which the impact of 
the Competition Act 1998 and the compliance message had been integrated within the 
organization we asked whether internal or external lawyers or other professionals were 
contacted for advice in the context of a range of potentially anti-competitive situations, 
and the responses are detailed in Table 11.  
 
Table 5 
Views On: Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neither Agree Strongly 
Agree 
Scale 
(1-5) 
Invest a Lot of Time and 
Money in Compliance 
Training 
15 40 40 5 0 2.4 
(2.94) 
Compliance requirements 
integrated into daily 
operating procedures 
10 40 5 40 5 2.9 
(3.69) 
Managers aware of 
compliance responsibilities 
5 20 10 65 0 3.35 
(3.61) 
Compliance staff easy 
access to top management 
5 10 10 50 25 3.8 
(4.1) 
Compliance problems 
quickly communicated 
5 5 20 60 10 3.65 
(3.99) 
Compliance programme 5 35 50 10 0 2.65 
                                                 
54 See for example, O’Meara, “Corporate Antitrust Compliance Programmes” [1988] European 
Competition Law Review 59; Marks “Setting up an Anti-Trust Compliance Programme” [1988] European 
Competition Law Review 59; C Parker, “Evaluating Regulatory Compliance: Standards and Best Practice” 
(1999) 7 The Trade Practices Journal 62; B Rodger, “Competition Law Compliance Programmes: A study 
of Motivations and Practice” (2005) World Competition 349, 361-371. 
55 See Rodger, ibid, 371-374. 
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reviewed regularly (3.39) 
Adequate resources to 
implement compliance 
policy 
0 30 50 10 10 3.5 
(3.77) 
Systematic non-compliance 
always reported to 
authority figures 
0 5 45 45 5 3.5 
(3.77) 
 
In every category in Table 5 the mean figure is lower than under the Australian 
compliance study,56 surprising given the anticipation of greater compliance commitment 
following investigation/sanction by the relevant competition authorities. At least on a 
comparative basis, the respondents neither invest a lot of time and money in compliance 
training (55 disagreed/ disagreed strongly) nor consider that adequate resources were 
available to implement the compliance policy (only 20% agreed/agreed strongly). There 
is a link to the perceived costs and gains of compliance/non-compliance which will be 
considered further infra. A key aspect of compliance management is 
evaluation/review/auditing57 and the respondents appear to be weak here with only 10% 
agreeing that their compliance programme was reviewed regularly.58  
 
Graph 5 
                                                 
56 C Parker, and V L Nielsen, “Corporate Compliance Systems: Could they make any difference?” 
forthcoming at p42. 
57 See for instance C Parker, “Evaluating Regulatory Compliance: Standards and Best Practice” (1999) 7 
The Trade Practices Journal 62.  
58 See Rodger, supra n 9, which noted at that stage that only 41.1% of respondents undertook evaluation as 
part of their compliance programme. 
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It is notable from Graph 5 that only three respondents had one or more full-time 
compliance employee equivalents and 73.7% of respondents had less than a half full-time 
employee equivalent, whereas under the Australian study, 41% had at least one full-time 
dedicated compliance employee. Nonetheless, the number of compliance-related staff 
alone is a necessary but insufficient test for adequate compliance, and it is informative to 
assess the extent to which the main elements of an ideal compliance programme have 
been adopted. 
 
 
(f) Key elements of Compliance 
The key elements of compliance have been broken down into four key groups, within 
which each of the specific issues is related: complaints handling, communication and 
training; Management Accountability and Whistle-blowing; and Compliance 
Performance Measurement/Discipline as set out in Tables 6-9. 
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Key Elements of Compliance 1-Complaints Handling 
 
Table 6 
Complaints Handling Yes No 
Record of Complaints Kept 60 40 
Clear system for handling compliance failures 35 65 
 
 
Key elements of Compliance 2- Communication and Training 
 
Table 7 
Communication and Training Yes No 
Organisation has a dedicated compliance unit 0 100 
New employees given competition compliance training 15 85 
Compliance manual used in compliance training 0 100 
At least half of employees attended Act Seminar in last 5 
yrs 
5 95 
Organisation has written compliance policy 20 80 
Occasional refresher course on compliance 0 100 
OFT staff invited for talk/seminar in last 5 years 5 95 
Training session as part of compliance training 0 95 
Computer based training programme used 0 95 
 
 
 
Key elements of Compliance 3- Management Accountability and Whistle-blowing 
 
Table 8 
Management Accountability and Whistle-Blowing Yes No 
Written policies to encourage and protect whistle-
blowers 
15 85 
Managers report regularly on compliance 15 85 
Systematic audits by externals for competition law 
breaches 
5 95 
External consultant reviewed programme in last 5 years 25 75 
 
 
Key elements of Compliance 4- Compliance Performance Measurement/Discipline 
 
Table 9 
Compliance performance measurement Yes No 
Employees disciplined for breaching compliance 
programme in last 5 years 
10 90 
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Table 10 collates the information by providing the banded mean figure for each category, 
based on yes=1 and no=0, and compares this with the similar result from the Australian 
study.  
Table 10 
Compliance Element Current Research Australian Study 
Complaints Handling 0.48 0.57 
Communication and 
Training 
0.05 0.31 
Management 
Accountability and 
Whistle-blowing 
0.15 0.30 
Compliance Performance 
Measurement/Discipline 
0.10 0.13 
 
It should be emphasized that although the questions within the Communication and 
Training and Management Accountability and Whistle-blowing groups were virtually 
identical, the Australian compliance study contained more consumer-oriented questions 
in the Complaints Handling group and also additional questions in the final Compliance 
Performance Measurement/Discipline set which were not considered as important or 
relevant in this context. The outcomes in the two studies are notably differentiated in 
relation to management accountability and whistle-blowing and even more dramatic for 
the communication and training group. The results of the current study for these elements 
are disappointing, noting in particular that none of the respondents have a dedicated 
compliance unit, and that 85% responded No to whether new employees were given 
compliance training.59 Moreover, given the importance of communication from top-down 
                                                 
59 cf Rodger, supra n9, where 51.8% responded that all relevant staff received training on competition 
issues. This is particularly notable given the greater likelihood of implementation of the various elements 
after a firm had experienced an ACCC breach investigation, which suggested, according to Parker and 
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about a corporate culture of compliance and for employees to understand and engage 
with the compliance policy, it renders the responses regarding self-estimated levels of 
compliance in recent years, as discussed below, surprisingly optimistic. Even in the 
Australian compliance study, it was concluded that implementation of compliance 
systems by Australian businesses was partial,60 and it has been argued that attempts at 
compliance may in any event be simply symbolic.61 Nonetheless, Parker and Nielsen 
identified a clear correlation between implementation of compliance elements and 
enhanced compliance management in practice, and accordingly, implementation of key 
elements of a compliance programme may be a proxy for effective compliance.62 
Accordingly there is an important role for regulators, such as the OFT, to educate, 
promote and encourage the adoption and implementation of a range of key elements of 
standard compliance programmes, noting in particular the very weak performance of the 
respondents in this study in relation to aspects of communication and training. 
 
(g) Compliance in Practice 
 
Table 11 
                                                                                                                                                 
Nielsen, supra n 16, 476, that enforcement activity “is very important for pushing firms beyond the most 
commonly implemented compliance system elements – …towards deeper implementation.” 
60 Parker and Nielsen, supra n 16, 444. 
61 D C Langevoort, “Monitoring: The Behavioural Economics of Corporate Compliance with Law” (2002) 
71 Columbia Business Law Review 114. 
62 Parker and Nielsen, supra n 16,478-479. See also C Parker, and  V L Nielsen, “Do Corporate 
Compliance Programs Influence Compliance? (September 2006) Social Science Research Network 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=930238 accessed on 5 April 2008. 
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Scenarios: Never Sometimes Mostly Always Have never had 
any such activity 
Competitor contacts to 
discuss aspects of the market 
35 25 5 5 20 
Sharing information with 
your industry association 
45 30 0 0 25 
Sharing info with other 
organizations/competitors 
40 25 0 0 35 
Attending industry 
association meetings 
45 30 0 0 25 
 
 
Table 11 details the respondents’ answers relating to the frequency with which they 
would ask for advice about the Competition Act from internal/external lawyers or other 
professionals in connection with those activities. Perhaps the most worrying aspect is that 
30% would never or only sometimes seek advice where a competitor contacted to discuss 
aspects of the market, a situation which should immediately raise concerns about 
prohibited collusive behaviour between competitors.  
 
 
(h) Costs and Benefits of Complying with the Act 
Table 12 
Compliance Costs Very 
small 
Small Neither Large Very 
large 
Scale 
(1-5) 
Administrative costs  40 50 10 0 0 1.7 
(2.17)
Expenses on 
lawyers/compliance 
professionals 
45 25 20 5 5 2 
(2.53)
Costs of compliance systems 
and training 
45 25 20 0 5 1.9 
(2.26)
 
Table 12 details the respondents’ answers to three questions concerning their beliefs 
about the costs of compliance with the Competition Act. The mean answer to the 
responses is noted on the basis of the scale 1-5, from very small (1) to very large (5). The 
responses indicate the very low costs incurred by the respondent organisations in relation 
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to compliance. On the one hand, it is surprising that in each category the perceived costs 
are lower than in the Australian compliance study,63 given that all respondents have been 
involved in infringement proceedings, but the results are consistent with the weak 
performance of the respondents in relation to the communication and training aspects of 
compliance, though potentially inconsistent with the self-estimated compliance levels. 
Table 13 
Compliance Gains No 
gain
Very 
small
Small Neither Large Very 
Large 
Scale 
(1-6) 
Better monitoring tools 30 20 5 35 10 0 2.75 
(3.22)
Better knowledge of our 
organisation 
35 20 0 40 5 0 3.45 
(3.94)
Better Image 25 0 10 35 30 0 3.45 
(3.94)
Absence of OFT Problems 10 5 10 25 20 30 4.3 
(4.06)
 
Table 13 details the respondents’ answers to four questions concerning their beliefs about 
the potential business gains of compliance with the Competition Act. The mean answer to 
the responses is noted on the basis of the scale 1-6, from no gain (1) to very large (6). The 
responses indicate a generally low recognition of the potential gains of compliance, with 
the exception of the absence of OFT problems where 50% considered this to be a 
large/very large gain associated with compliance and the mean was higher than under the 
Australian compliance study,64 as could be anticipated in research focused on post-
infringement respondents.  Apart from this result, in both studies respondents generally 
perceived the costs and gains of compliance as fairly low, although clearly there is scope 
                                                 
63 See Parker and Nielsen, supra n 26, 41. 
64 Ibid. 
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for further work in understanding how firms perceive costs and gains and translate these 
into decisions on compliance management. 
 
(i) Compliance and Enforcement problem Scenarios 
 
Table 14 
Problem: Very 
Small 
Small Neither Large Very 
large 
Scale 
(1-5) 
OFT Chair announces 
investigation at press 
conference 
10 5 0 25 60 4.20 
(4.51)
OFT Fine £100k 5 0 0 25 50 4.55 
(4.48)
OFT Fine £1m 0 5 5 0 90 4.79 
(4.84)
OFT Fine 10% Turnover 0 0 0 5 95 4.95 
(4.92)
Improved Compliance and 
Consumer Compensation 
£100k 
0 5 15 10 70 4.4 
Improved Compliance and 
Consumer compensation £1m 
0 0 15 0 85 4.7 
(4.82)
Loss of morale in organisation 0 0 25 30 45 4.2 
(4.02)
Criminal conviction and 
prison 
0 0 0 5 95 4.95 
(4.85)
Private law suit 0 0 10 5 85 4.75 
(4.69)
 
Table 14 details the respondents’ answers to a range of questions concerning their beliefs 
about the costs of non-compliance with the Competition Act, by asking how much of a 
problem senior management would find those costs if they were ever caught by the OFT 
breaching the Act . The mean answer to the responses is noted on the basis of the scale 1-
5, from very small (1) to very large (5). The responses indicate a remarkably similar 
outcome as in relation to the series of virtually identical questions under the Australian 
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compliance study,65 in which the responses indicate a very high concern with the various 
potential costs of non-compliance. Mirroring that study, there is some variation with 
certain costs inevitably perceived as greater than others,66 and the most serious clearly 
perceived as being a fine of 10% turnover and a criminal conviction and prison sentence 
for an individual. Heavier sanctions clearly focus management on compliance although it 
has been argued that punitive sanctions can be counter-productive.67 
 
(j) Third party influence- Economic Losses and Loss of Third Party Respect/esteem 
 
As discussed above, third parties, notably social and economic stakeholders, may play an 
important role in promoting compliance commitment, and the extent to which businesses 
take third parties into account is examined in the data set out on Tables 15 and 16. 
 
Table 15 
Economic Losses Worry 
very 
little 
Worry 
a little 
Neither Worry 
a lot 
Worry 
very 
much 
Scale 
(1-5) 
Your suppliers 35 30 5 10 20 2.5 
                                                 
65 See Parker and Nielsen, supra n 26, 24. It should be noted that the Australian compliance study referred 
to fines in Aus $ and the current study refers to GB pound sterling (£). 
66 Note that in relation to the question regarding an OFT Fine of £1mill, one respondent noted N/A. 
Although this was placed in the neither category in the Table, the mean was calculated on the basis of the 
other 19 responses. 
67 See for instance Parker and Nielsen, supra n 26, 26, noting that their responses tallied “with the 
observation in other empirical research on deterrence that there is no linear relationship between the 
severity of penalties available and the fear or perceived costs of those penalties among those at whom 
regulation is targeted- greater penalties do not automatically mean greater deterrence in equal measure.” It 
has been argued accordingly that heavy-handed punishment may act as a disincentive or cause resistance to 
enhanced compliance efforts. 
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(2.82)
Your industry association 20 20 30 10 20 2.9 
(2.73)
Consumer Groups/NGOs 10 15 35 20 20 3.25 
(3.13)
Your Business partners 0 20 20 20 40 3.4 
(3.5) 
Your shareholders 0 0 30 20 45 4.16 
(4.08)
Your customers 10 5 10 30 45 3.95 
(4.18)
Your employees 5 10 15 30 40 3.9 
(3.87)
Informal business networks 10 20 35 15 20 3.15 
(2.99)
The media 5 15 30 30 20 3.45 
(3.52)
 
Table 15 details the respondents’ answers to the following question: - If your 
organization were accused again of breaches of the Competition Act in future, how much 
would your organization worry about economic losses in relation to the following groups 
of people? The mean answer to the responses is noted on the basis of the scale 1-5, from 
worry very little (1) to worry very much (5). Throughout, as denoted by the mean answer, 
the outcome is very similar in virtually all respects as under the Australian compliance 
study,68 although, in respect of economic losses, there is more concern with shareholders 
than with customers in a UK context.  
 
Table 16 
Loss of Respect/Esteem Worry 
very 
little 
Worry 
a little 
Neither Worry 
a lot 
Worry 
very 
much 
Scale 
(1-5) 
Your suppliers 25 15 15 20 25 3.05 
(3.26)
Your industry association 15 15 25 20 25 3.25 
                                                 
68 C Parker and V L Nielsen “To What Extent do Third Parties Influence Business Compliance” 
forthcoming at 10. 
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(3.27)
Consumer Groups/NGOs 10 25 20 25 20 3.2 
(3.51)
Your business partners 5 15 25 30 25 3.55 
(3.83)
Your shareholders 10 5 30 5 45 3.55 
(4.22)
Your customers 10 0 10 30 50 4 
(4.41)
Your employees 10 20 20 25 25 3.35 
(4.13)
Informal business networks 20 5 40 15 20 3.1 
(3.21)
The media 10 5 25 40 20 3.55 
(3.66)
Lawyers/Compliance 
professionals 
30 30 10 15 15 2.55 
(3.14)
Relatives 35 15 20 5 25 2.7 
(3.03)
Politicians 40 25 20 5 10 2.2 
(3.13)
 
 
Table 16 details the respondents’ answers to the following question: - If your 
organization were accused again of breaches of the Competition Act in future, how much 
would your organization worry about losing the respect and esteem of the following 
groups of people? The mean answer to the responses is noted on the basis of the scale 1-
5, from worry very little (1) to worry very much (5). A considerably lower proportion of 
respondents were concerned about loss of respect/esteem than economic losses in relation 
to shareholders. Generally, there is a discernibly lower concern for loss of respect/esteem 
across the categories of third parties in comparison with the Australian compliance study 
where social losses in relation to third parties were viewed as being equally severe as 
their economic losses,69 with the results for shareholders, customers, employees and 
                                                 
69 Ibid, 10-11. 
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politicians in the current study notably lower, suggesting a lower social and/or political 
motivation to comply with the law. This is particularly surprising given that slightly more 
of those who interacted with ACCC perceived the social costs of non-compliance as 
higher than the economic costs.70 Nielsen and Parker, despite skepticism regarding the 
direct role of third parties currently in driving compliance commitment,71 have 
emphasized the capacity and potential role for customers and shareholders in particular to 
‘activate most businesses’ economic and social motivations to support… compliance.’72 
Furthermore, although recognizing that third parties lack a more focused interest in 
compliance in competition and consumer law and policy than in other areas such as 
environmental regulation, they advocate action by the enforcement agency, such as the 
ACCC, or the OFT, to encourage and enhance the role of such third parties in promoting 
better compliance by those businesses in which they are stakeholders.73   
 
(j) Economic Gains of Breach 
 
Table 17 
Economic Gains Not 
Relevant
Very 
Small 
Small Neither Large Very 
large 
Scale 
(1-6) 
Saved production 
costs 
40 25 0 30 0 5 2.4 
Gain of market share 20 35 5 10 15 10 3.05 
Saved competition 
costs 
20 25 15 30 5 5 2.9 
                                                 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid, 28:- “There is little evidence in our study that the mere existence of stakeholder relationships is 
sufficient to ‘drive’ differences in business compliance management behaviour.” 
72 Ibid, 11. See also J Black, “Enrolling Actors in Regulatory Processes: Examples from UK Financial 
services Regulation” (2003) Public Law 62. 
73 Parker and Nielsen, supra  n 68, 30. 
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Saved paperwork 
time and money 
20 25 15 30 5 5 2.95 
Instant one shot 
economic gain 
20 30 10 25 10 0 2.74 
Saved costs on 
lawyers/compliance 
professionals 
15 30 10 20 0 25 3.35 
 
Table 17 details the respondents’ answers to the following question: - How large were the 
economic gains from breaching the Act? The mean answer to the responses is noted on 
the basis of the scale 1-6, from not relevant (1) to very large (6).74 In the Australian 
compliance study, the highest gains were considered to be in respect of market share, 
whereas a much lower figure was obtained for the gains in respect of saved costs on 
lawyers/compliance professional fees,75 which were considered to be the greatest gains 
from non-compliance in the present study. This reflects to an extent the lack of concern 
about the loss of respect/esteem by those professionals as detailed in Table 16, and is also 
clearly consistent with responses as set out in Tables 5, 7, 11 and 12, confirming the low 
levels of investment in compliance, the poor performance in terms of ongoing 
communication and training, the disappointing infrequency with which lawyers are 
contacted regarding competitor contacts, and the low costs associated with compliance 
with the Act. In fact the respondents appear to be saying that we spend little in 
complying, and indeed those cost savings are the greatest gains associated with breach!! 
 
Table 18 
Economic Gains of None Very Tiny Substantial Very Scale 
                                                 
74 It should be noted that there is no Australian comparative here because the Australian study calculated 
the mean figures on a scale of 1-5. The ‘not relevant’ category was included in this study and is deemed 
to equate to no gain. 
75 Parker and Nielsen supra n 26, 41. 
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breach: Tiny  Substantial  (1-5) 
Anticipated Income 
Improvement in 
Last 6 years 
5 30 5 5 15 2.75 
 
Table 18 collates the responses to the question: How large on average would you and 
your organization estimate to be the expected value of breaches of the Competition Act 
committed by your organization in the last 6 years? 8, 40%, responded ‘didn’t know’, and 
accordingly the mean of 2.75 was calculated from the remaining 12 responses, and 
overall the perception from Tables 17 and 18 is that the gains for beach are low, a similar 
outcome to the Australian compliance study.76 In that context, only 6% considered the 
gains to be substantial or very substantial, and 55.6% saw a tiny or very tiny 
improvement on income, and the results in Table 18 suggest a slightly higher awareness 
of the potential economic gains from breach of the Competition Act.77 Given the 
generally low levels of perceived gains it is important to consider why organizations do 
breach the relevant rules. 
 
(k) Why breach Competition Act?  
 
Table 19 
Why Breach? Yes No 
Did not know we had 
breached law 
70 30 
Thought we would 
save/gain a lot of money 
15 85 
Specific rule breached was 0 100 
                                                 
76 Ibid, 38-40. 
77 This may be partly explained by the focus in the present study on competition issues, as opposed to 
combined consumer and competition law compliance in the Australian compliance study, and also reflect 
the fact that all responses were in relation to Chapter I infringements given the potential gains associated 
with cartel activity. 
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damaging to UK economy 
and not to be obeyed 
Relied on incorrect legal 
advice 
10 90 
Inadequate management 
controls over employees 
20 80 
 
 
Table 19 provides the responses to the question:-Why did your organization breach the 
Competition Act? Respondents were allowed to tick more than one of the options, and in 
addition a small minority, 15%, noted other, unspecified, reason for the breach. The most 
significant response is clearly the 70% of respondents who noted that breach was a result 
of their lack of awareness that they had breached the law, unsurprising given the 
responses in relation to the perceived costs of compliance and the limited provision of 
communication and training elements as part of a corporate compliance programme. This 
also suggests that further educational initiatives by the UK competition authorities may 
be appropriate.  
 
 
(l) Crosstabs 
Nielsen and Parker noted that businesses generally rate themselves highly in relation to 
broad questions about their purported values and estimated levels of compliance, but that 
the responses are more varied, and generally lower, when asked to respond to more 
objective or quantifiable specific issues.78 This is reflected in the current study and 
accordingly, we crosstabulated the responses to various questions to ascertain to what 
extent they were consistent. Table 20 crosstabulates the belief that the organization and 
employees are well-informed about the Act with the reason for breach being that we did 
not know they had breached the law. Thirteen organizations agreed or agreed strongly 
                                                 
78 C Nielsen and V L Parker, Preliminary Report, December 2005, 39. 
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with the former proposition, but of those, 9, 69.2%, responded that a reason for breach 
was that they did not know they had breached the law. Nonetheless one must bear in 
mind the time-lag between breach and the completion of the questionnaire during which 
knowledge levels among employees may have increased, although this is not evidenced 
by the responses on communication and training discussed above. 
 
Table 20 
Why Breach: Did 
Not Know Law  Total  
 Yes  No  Yes  
Strongly 
disagree  1  0  1  
Disagree  2  1  3  
Neither  2  1  3  
Agree  6  2  8  
Believe Organisation 
and Employees Well-
Informed about Act  
Strongly agree 3  2  5  
Total  14  6  20  
 
Similar evidence that the responses to broad subjective questions about beliefs and values 
generally are not borne out by the evidence from the answers to specific quantifiable 
questions comes from a crosstabulation of the answers to the question seeking views on 
the damaging or beneficial nature of agreements to fix prices with the question whether 
respondents seek advice when sharing information with competitors. As Table 21 
demonstrates, despite recognizing the damaging or very damaging nature of price-fixing, 
respondents fail to see the natural link between this type of activity and a common form 
of achieving such a price-fixing conspiracy, namely by sharing sensitive information with 
competitors. Of the 12 respondents who considered price-fixing to be damaging or very 
damaging, 6 never sought advice and a further 2 only sometimes sought advice when 
sharing information with a competitor. 
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Table 21 
   
Seek Advice  when sharing info 
with competitors Total  
  Price-fixing agreements Never  Sometimes 
Have never 
had such 
an activity   
Views of 
respondents  
Very 
damaging  2  1  2  5  
   Damaging  3  1  3  7  
   Neither  2  3  2  7  
   Beneficial  1  0  0  1  
Total  8  5  7  20  
 
We also crosstabulated the respondents’ self-estimated culture of compliance in the year 
2006 with their responses to the question whether their compliance programme was 
reviewed regularly. Although review/auditing is generally considered to be a fundamental 
element of an effective compliance programme, it is notable that of the 7 respondents 
who self-estimated a 100% culture of compliance for 2006, none of those organizations 
review their compliance programme regularly, further highlighting the limitations of a 
self-estimation exercise. Nonetheless, despite the numerous apparent contradictions and 
inconsistencies in the responses across the questionnaire, the information is consistent in 
some respects, with for instance a correlation between the responses to the measurement 
of compliance gains in the form of the absence of OFT problems, and respondents’ views 
on whether the OFT had a wide range of sanctions, as  of the 10 respondents who 
considered the gains to be large or very large, 9 agreed or agreed strongly that the OFT 
had a wide range of effective sanctions. 
 
D. CONCLUSIONS 
This research was modeled on the Australian compliance study, which had suggested that 
compliance commitment was likely to increase following competition authority 
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infringement action, by being targeted at business which had already been the subject of 
competition enforcement action in the UK. The response rate was 33%, a satisfactory 
level albeit with a very small sample which limits any broad conclusions being drawn 
about compliance attitudes and systems implementation by UK businesses generally. 
However, although this study itself demonstrated the limitations in self-assessed 
questionnaire surveys, it provides us with further understanding of the links between 
regulatory enforcement strategies, industry compliance and other motivating factors 
generally, while also indicating the disappointing level of compliance system 
implementation among the respondents. 79 Although the respondents suggested there were 
very good levels of awareness of the Competition Act, unfortunately this response was 
not reflected in respect of the range of more specific and detailed questions. The number 
of compliance employees in the respondent organisations was low and there is clearly a 
role for the OFT to educate, promote and encourage the adoption and implementation of 
a range of key elements of standard compliance programmes, noting the very weak 
performance of the respondents in this study in relation to aspects of communication and 
training in particular.80 Furthermore, 70% of respondents noted that breach was a result 
                                                 
79 The responses are not necessarily representative of the full sample, and certainly not of UK industry in 
general. Indeed, a number of the organisations in the sample were relatively small construction companies 
and this may at least partly account for the poor performance in terms of compliance system 
implementation. 
80 For a discussion of the extent to which adoption of compliance management elements actually influences 
or leads to better actual compliance, see C Parker and  V L Nielsen, “Do Corporate Compliance Programs 
Influence Compliance” and Corporate Compliance Systems: Do they make any Difference?’ both 
forthcoming. 
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of their lack of awareness that they had breached the law, suggesting that further 
educational initiatives by the UK competition authorities may be appropriate. The 
Australian study findings that organisations subjected to enforcement action are more 
likely to be committed to compliance would present a very worrying picture of 
compliance practice in the UK generally based on the results, albeit limited, of the 
present study. In 1999, before the prohibitions came into force the OFT developed a 
compliance policy, comprising inter alia the publication of guidelines under s52 of the 
Act, and the OFT sought to increase awareness and compliance by launching an 
education programme through its Education and Compliance section. At that stage, I 
suggested that the OFT had adopted a three-pronged strategy or an “enhanced carrot and 
stick” approach;81 incorporating a deterrent strategy; an educative strategy; and a third 
“legitimising” strategy, involving OFT officials touring the country to explain the nature 
and rationale of the new legislation. The OFT website currently has a dedicated page on 
compliance,82 and they also have related publications and a CDROM called ‘Compliance 
Matters!’ but perhaps this research indicates that the OFT could channel more resources 
to the educational and informational strategy which was fairly prominent and pro-active 
at the time the Act was introduced. 
Despite the overly subjective nature of a questionnaire involving self-estimated levels of 
awareness and compliance, business perceptions of the competition authority’s role and 
its impact on compliance strategies, together with a range of other motivating factors, 
                                                 
81 Rodger, supra n 9, 280 -281. 
82 http://www.oft.gov.uk/advice_and_resources/resource_base/legal/competition-act-1998/compliance 
accessed on 4 April 2008. 
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including perceived costs and gains to itself and third parties, help to facilitate a fuller 
understanding of why businesses may or may not comply with the law.  There are, as 
noted, potentially pluralistic motivations for compliance with legal rules,83 and following 
earlier research, there is some limited support for the three key theoretical frameworks 
underpinning the promotion of effective compliance- rational-choice based deterrence, 
moral corporate citizenship based on normative affirmation of the legal principles; and 
managerial (in)competence based on the (non-) adoption and implementation of effective 
compliance systems. In relation to deterrence, and the threat of enforcement action, 
respondents generally were aware of the likelihood and high severity of enforcement 
action, though to an extent this reflected the focus of the study on post-infringement 
compliance, and the subsequent responses to questions of costs/gains and adoption of 
compliance elements did not appear to be consistent with the barometer of regulatory 
threat.  More specifically, we considered business perceptions as to costs and gains of 
compliance and non-compliance with the Competition Act, and we also asked 
respondents to consider various enforcement scenarios and potential sanctions. Increasing 
the severity of sanctions clearly has an impact on levels of management concern, and 
although it has been suggested that punitive sanctions may be counter-productive, the 
study suggests that the level of fines imposed alone has not sufficiently motivated 
compliance efforts. However, this may be changing recently with the ‘imposition’ of 
higher fines,84 and there is also evidence that the message about the moral seriousness of 
                                                 
83 See Winter and May, supra n 33, regarding their threefold typology of compliance motivating factors:- 
‘calculative’, ‘normative’ and ‘social’. 
84 See for instance OFT press release 113/07, 1 August 2007, noting that BA is to pay a record £121.5 mill 
fine for collusion in relation to long-haul passenger fuel surcharges. 
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the cartel offence has not been adequately communicated publicly,85 again supporting the 
need for further education campaigns by the OFT and by the wider political authorities to 
reinforce messages about the legitimacy of the competition rules, as highlighted by the 
National Audit Office.   
Moreover, a focus on “perceptual deterrence” allows us to recognise that in addition to 
purely formal, enforcer-led sanctions, deterrence may extend to broader social and 
economic sanctions which may impact on compliance, a context in which third party 
stakeholders may play an important role in develop compliance culture by exercising a 
combination of businesses’ calculative, social and normative motivations to comply. The 
results in this context were broadly similar to the Australian compliance study, although 
in respect of economic losses, there is more concern with shareholders than with 
customers in a UK context and a discernibly lower concern for loss of respect/esteem 
across the categories of third parties. This suggests that the OFT may have a bigger task 
in seeking to encourage and enhance the role of such third parties in promoting better 
compliance by those businesses in which they are stakeholders. Furthermore, given that 
                                                 
85 C Parker, “The ‘Compliance’ Trap: The Moral Message in Responsive Regulatory Enforcement’, (2006) 
40 Law & Society Review 591. See A Stephan, Survey of Public Attitudes to price-fixing and cartel 
enforcement in Britain, CCP Working Paper 07-12, in which 73% of respondents recognised the harmful 
effects of price-fixing but only 11% considered imprisonment  to be appropriate, only 7% compared it to 
theft and 8% to fraud. 
Interestingly, anecdotal comments from some of the respondents matched the typology of regulatee 
motivational posturing, involving blatantly antagonism to the regulatory regime, helplessness 
(disengagement), and offense at government intrusion, as set out by V Braithwaite, J Braithwaite, D 
Gibson, and T Makkai, in “Regulatory Styles, Motivational Postures and Nursing Home Compliance” 
(1994) 16 Law and Policy  363. 
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respondents considered saved costs on lawyers/compliance professionals as the highest 
economic gains of breach, allied with the lack of concern about any loss of 
respect/esteem by those professionals associated with non-compliance, more work could 
be done to encourage compliance professionalism generally in this country.86 
 
86 See C Parker, “Compliance professionalism and regulatory community: The Australian Trade Practices 
regime” (1999) 26 Journal of Law & Society 215. 
